Log file contents showing 1 complete transaction and the transaction shown above: Put /opt/gos/GOS_SPK/APPS/MPM/WTM/PR3.0/Mfg_MPM/TestData/GenericCalFiles/Dc2_TransSettlingFreq_generic.cal aaaaaaa/WirelessTestManager/Mfg_MPM/TestData/GenericCalFiles/Dc2_TransSettlingFreq_generic.calĭir aaaaaaa/WirelessTestManager/Mfg_MPM/TestData/GenericCalFiles/Ĭhmod 664 aaaaaaa/WirelessTestManager/Mfg_MPM/TestData/GenericCalFiles/Dc2_TransSettlingFreq_generic.cal I was only trying to say, that, IMHO, not supporting these paths is as ridiculous, as not supporting Unicode.Contents of the command file being executed by client:
If "all today's apps" must support overlong paths, why don't the reference apps from Microsoft support it? Let me answer this one: There simply is no such requirement why not leave an ability to set such a path directly in “FileZilla Server.xml”? (Or add some (hidden?) “allow_unsecure_long_paths” setting, to be absolutely sure, that user actually knows what he is doing) I agree this might be a good reason to disable such paths in GUI, if this could be considered as a "vulnerability". Could you please provide an example, where this approach fails? And it works OK for long paths – just add “\\?\” after this “normalization”.). Neither I know whether all (or some) of those issues could be avoided by, say, passing each file name through "GetFullPathName" (AFAIK, it aims to do just that – “parse” or “normalize” the path string.
Even though I do not know much about such attacks. There are all sorts of shenanigans one can do with unchecked paths. Which checking needs to be performed varies based on the underlying filesystem.
All the safety checks done by the Windows API are bypassed and need to be re-implemented in the program using the prefix.
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